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In today’s world, the power sector is facing many difficulties
due to growing consumption, aging of infrastructure and rising
costs. Smart grids promise the energy producers and con-
sumers for a reliable and efficient power system. To imposethis idea into real time, several aspects need to be imposed such
as proper communication system between consumers and util-
ity providers and efficient energy management to control the
system in proper working condition. Metering and billing have
to be carried out astutely, as the consumers may be charged for
their non-linear load usage. Residential consumers may end up
with new tariffs where they will be charged for different types
of power usage. Hereafter consumers have to be tech savvy for
being economic and environmental friendly. This aspect leads
to the concept of Demand Response (DR) [1–3] to play its key
role in electricity markets. Demand side management (DSM)
refers to programs implemented by utility companies to con-
trol the energy consumption at the consumer side [1–3]. The
requirements between the energy provider and the customer
are coordinated by the Demand Response (DR) strategy
[2–6]. The strategy emboldens the customer to reduce the
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DSM techniques at the distribution end of the power system
the gap between supply and demand can also be reduced.
The major objective of DSM is to encourage customer to
participate in schemes to reduce peak demand and shifting
the load. One such mechanism is DR, in which the system
allows end users to alter their load pattern to reduce the overall
peak of the system.
A complete survey on demand response in smart grid with
exhaustive analysis of mathematical problems is resolved for
future extensions of DR using hierarchy game [2], and coupled
constraint game is elucidated. For future aspects, complete
analysis and structure of DR schemes start from policies, pro-
grams initiated, potential benefits, control devices for demand
response, and smart technologies for the scheme. The commu-
nication technologies, different monitoring systems, and han-
dling loads in a smarter approach are explained in a nutshell
[3,6,7]. The future aspects of the DR are potentially explained
by the methods of tracking with advanced control theory with
new controllers and optimization methods are elaborated. In
recent years, the effective emphasis on game theory approaches
on DSM techniques for energy scheduling in residential users
had been modeled in different strategies [9–15] with respect
to solutions done by heuristic optimization [22] and linear pro-
gramming techniques [23]. Hitherto, various approaches of
game theory approaches on demand side management are ana-
lyzed and modeled depicting the major concern of utility user
interaction, customer benefits and effective energy scheduling
development for reduction of cost. Noncooperative game
model considering the channel impairments by developing
dual optimality conditions is proposed in [8]. It exhibits differ-
ent objective functions among the users and the utility by
assuming a DSM game. In paper [9] the author formulates
energy scheduling problem for residential consumers using
coupled constraint game. In this the solution is handled by
two cases by temporally coupled constraint. An evolutionary
non cooperative game for the users and utility is observed with
different constraints of power in a two level game [10] which is
analyzed as multiple time constraints are not considered. User
comfort in DR is modeled in [11] as a simple approach with a
game based on modified regret matching procedure and bor-
rows with the users for reducing the energy bill. A mathemat-
ical optimization technique and game theoretic approach are
analyzed by the concept of incentive based management pre-
sented in [12,13] both for centralized and decentralized
schemes. Interaction among the users is formulated in [14] as
a repeated game chain in order to solve the issue of discomfort
with a game strategy of incentive compatible obtain joint com-
fort and billing cost minimization. In the proposed games
[15,16] authors deal with aggregate game handling to improve
the behavior of selfish consumers using proximal point algo-
rithm [15] and cheat proof analysis [16]. In [18] Stackelberg
game is approached in order to reduce total in convinces cre-
ated in consumers achieving load curtailment. Different strate-
gies using game theory approaches and other programming
analysis have been analyzed in the past literature exhibiting
new strategy for the way of minimizing cost for the consumers
and maximizing the peak to average ratio (PAR) for the utility.
The strategy used in the past literature exhibits all the versatil-
ity of cost minimization, considering tariff schemes, comfort of
users and also maximizing PAR. Thoroughly analyzing and
understanding the past literature, the authors proposed a novelconcept of indulging a situation of DR congestion case with a
strategy of reducing cost and maximizing profit. There is a
possibility of the DR scheme to go in vain. This strategy is
used by incorporating a new algorithm for exhibiting the real-
ization to minimize cost and maximize profit among the users
and utility.
The motivation behind using game theory approach on
demand response modeling is the understanding of communi-
cation between two sources of utility and user. Generalized Tit
for Tat (GTFT) based method can reduce the cost between dif-
ferent users which effectively adjourns the case of DR conges-
tion. Tit for tat is traditionally defined as a game played
between two players. As in for many players and for highly
interact able environment, a better strategy is required. On this
effect it is reasonable to model the scheduling by incorporating
a cooperative game. In the proposed work the authors handle
GTFT mechanism to model the energy scheduling problem in
DR modeling. The main objective is to minimize cost and max-
imize PAR of the utility.
The main contributions of the model are as follows:
 A generalized tit for tat based cooperative energy schedul-
ing game is proposed in a smart grid environment.
 A very simple and feasible solution is obtained by handling
the cost reduction and PAR maximization overall.
 Extensive simulations are carried out by developing this
algorithm in hold with the strategy of win stay lose shift
for the consideration parameter of managing DR
congestion.
 The past literature has invoked different algorithm
approaches considering the cost, comfort and PAR. The
condition of DR congestion is not handled. However devel-
oping a DR scheme is necessary in a smart grid environ-
ment for energy savings. But the necessity of holding the
scheme is successfully evaluated in this algorithm using
mainly the strategy done by the consumers.
Fig. 1 exhibits the hand in hand gesture of information
technology and electrical scenario in the present technological
generation. This enables the utility and the users to actively
engage in these DR programs. In this paper a new methodol-
ogy is proposed between the utility provider and the user using
game theory decision making strategy. The main objective is to
develop a DSM using a game theory algorithm providing dif-
ferent optimum pricing schemes for each user under the utility
provider. The algorithm depends basically on each user decid-
ing on their own winning strategy and secondarily on all other
participant individual decisions. Furthermore, in order to
reduce demand, the utility company will announce the demand
period. Hence users will avoid using loads at peak time using
DR programs. Consider a situation where electricity is cheap
at 10:00 am. Most customers will switch on their appliances
at this time thus increasing the demand and thereby defeating
the purpose of DR program. Simulation results with
MATLAB and computational simulation domain show the
effectiveness of the decision making scheme by the consumers
with utility provider and work dynamically for different anal-
ysis of user profile.
The outline of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
explains the background of game theory and the proposed
methodology. The flowchart and implementation steps of
methodology with problem statement with mathematical
Figure 1 Demand side management perspective in the present electrical scenario.
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ation of performance comparison are given in Section 4.Tif for Tat GTFT
Always cooperateAlways defect
Win stay Lose shift
Figure 2 Strategy model.2. Game theory – demand response modeling
Game theory is a strategic decision making tool of situations
involving a number of players aspiring for different purposes.
Mostly, it is the study of mathematical models of conflict and
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers
[2,17]. It is a formal analytical method with strategic decision
making imbibed with a set of mathematical models empower-
ing the study of complex interactions among independent
rational players [19,20,15]. In the literature [12–16] the game
theory decision making strategy proposed portrays energy
scheduling with cost reduction using different player’s strategy
with the utility. In game theory, the players of the game are the
main invaders to make decisions, and they are involved to par-
ticipate in a game for the achievement of getting maximum
benefit in a suitable action. So the main elements in a game
are players, information, strategy and payoff functions. In
our smart grid environment, the task of competition is a game
played among ‘N’ consumers considered as players. So the
basic elements considered are the player set N: the set of all
consumers/users.
In the strategy of Tit for Tat wherein it is a game among the
players who attain the final Nash equilibrium wherein if both
cooperates there is a success in the game and they receive a
payoff which is an extended version of Prisoners dilemma.
As such in this cooperation rather exhibits as an option if
the game is repeated. Later, the strategy of Generalized Tit
for Tat (GTFT) is among players for instinct when both play-
ers cooperate, if one defects the other cooperates with a prob-
ability. Moreover among the players, it is an evolution of
forgiveness as the win stay, lose shift. This concept is used in
the algorithm of DSM model as such the players are the
consumers and hold different payoffs by developing a utility
function. The strategy is depending upon the move they
play as the tariff generated or the reward they obtain. Themotivation of using this game in this concept is that the con-
sumers play among a network between the users and they try
to cooperate best among the other consumers by scheduling
the load. The utility target of minimizing the PAR and the user
to minimize the cost. If among the players, who reach the first
target wins the game whereas the other shifts the game. Fig. 2
shows the pictorial representation of game strategy.
The game theory strategy is analyzed under the assumption
that each player cares only about himself. GTFT is a strategy
of win stay and lose shift as mentioned in [24–27], used as a
multiplayer domain. In the proposed game, users are players
and the strategy is the usage of appliances and scheduling them
according to climatic conditions and user preference by defin-
ing the energy scheduling vector. Optimal performance in
terms of energy cost minimization is achieved by this GTFT
scheduling game. The proposed game model simultaneously
manages the appliance’s schedule calculated for all hours
and shifts the load during peak hours based on the PAR value.
If the value is less the cost will be less and hence the user will
obviously try to use the shiftable appliances at that time. And
further shifting of loads to non-peak hours considerably leads
Demand time info from
the supply
Intimation from
Utility
Initialise the algorithm
(Game theory)
Randomly choose users
Inform Users
Update
Initialise the algorithm
(Game theory)
Choose loads to reschedule
Any change
Mark, Update and choose
next user
Start Start
End
End
No
Yes
Yes
No
UTILITY USER
Any changes
Yes
No
Figure 4 Flowchart of the model exhibiting the general work
flow between the utility and the user incorporating game theory
algorithm.
Table 1 Random load power generated in per unit value.
Domestic users Hour 1 Hour 2 Hour 3 Hour 4
User 1 0.7094 0.6797 0.119 0.3404
User 2 0.7547 0.6551 0.4984 0.5853
User 3 0.2761 0.1626 0.9597 0.2238
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optimal scheduling of appliances, the game is subdivided into
two parts which has been clearly explained in Section 3.
Fig. 3 explains typically the DR congestion happening in
non peak hours.
3. System model
The expected change in houses after complete implementation
of smart grid and smart meters at the consuming side includes
communication and embedded control. Using these two avail-
able technologies, applying the approach of generalized tit for
tat, game theory concept will ensure that the above stated
problem is reduced considerably. It can also be applied to very
large scale consumers since the technique is versatile. Consider
a situation that involves a utility company and several residen-
tial consumers. The utility company first estimates the electric-
ity demand for the next hours and sets the price for different
hours. Then, the utility company advertises these prices to
the customers over the supporting digital communication net-
work. Then, each user optimizes its energy consumption by
adopting the best scheduling for its appliances based on this
received price information from the utility company.
This proposed technique uses the game theory based
algorithm which will provide different optimum pricing for
each user under a utility. The algorithm is based on
Non-Cooperative game where one’s decision depends primar-
ily on his strategy and secondarily on all other participant’s
individual decisions. The control flow of the complete method-
ology with flowchart has been described as in Fig. 4. The
methodology is based on dominance game played by the user.
It is divided into two categories. The first part includes the util-
ity side tariff generation. The second part is based on the
demand developed by the entire unit of consumers; the utility
generates various tariffs for different hours in one day. This is
given as a day ahead schedule to the user. The user shall
modify distribution toward the hour where the tariff is low.
Their next day ahead schedule will be updated with more
number of hours consisting minimum rate and vice versa.
The Proposed methodology as in demand response modeling
incorporates the strategy assuming the players as consumers
and the scheduling of shift able and non-shiftable appliances
in a domestic consumer. The analysis is shown in Table. 1
and corresponding calculations have been done with three
users and further it is simulated for n users.
The steps involved in the algorithm were given as follows:Figure 3 Consumption accumulaStep 1: Get appliances’ schedule for H hours. For each
appliance a 2 A, an energy consumption scheduling vector
is defined asXn; a ¼ ½x1n;a . . . xHn;a ð1Þ
Step 2: Compute the load of the user n astion at non peak hours.
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X
a2An
xhn;ah 2 H ð2Þ
where H= overall load of each hour of a day i.e., 24.
Step 3: Determine the minimum load usage of the individ-
ual house.
Step 4: Schedule the appliances array in a matrix form with
a strategy Si where each row of Si is xn;a considering the user
domain and same strategy is analyzed to three houses and
stored as winning strategy W s, as the process can be
extended to multi users.
Step 5: Add load profile for small unit of houses. Sample up
to 10 houses and extendable to n number of houses are
calculated.
Step 6: Determine the time for which the value of the load
profile which gives minimum power usage.
Step 7: Reschedule the appliances vector Eq. (1) to the
determined minimum usage hour.
Step 8: The obtained vector is stored as user’s strategy.
Step 9: Compare the vector with winning strategy, which
exists as in final Nash equilibrium stage. The final utility
payoff function set as ui with the different strategies held
by the consumers as Si and set of n number of them exhibit-
ing an inequality function for all players and strictly follow-
ing their strategy profile.uiðsi ; s!i Þ > uiðsi; s!i Þ; 8si 2 Si ð3Þ
Step 10: In accordance with that the new winning strategy
is updated with the obtained vector. If the latter dominates
and the process continues with the procedure involved in
the utility and the user flow. Thus by arranging the demand
hours and load in ascending order for individual consumers
and updating the appliance array based on minimum hours
array.
Finally individual tariff for each consumer is evaluated cre-
ating a winning strategy of win stay and lose shift.
3.1. Mathematical model – formulation of game
To analyze the proposed model, the customers participate in
the energy scheduling game at each round with the process
of achieving the final winning strategy. A set of reactive strate-
gies are obtained by GTFT depending upon the behavior of
each player which depends on their previous move. The strat-
egy of scheduling the appliances is formulated by the proposed
game. The players schedule the appliances following the game
strategy and obtain utility payoff with reducing cost so they
repeat the move. The player fails to follow the rule of reducing
the cost, lose the game and shift the move in another round
with the concept of win stay and lose shift. The stages are fol-
lowed with cooperation and defend. The clear mathematical
model is explained to obtain the winning strategy with the tit
for tat game. A cost effective energy consumption scheduling
is done by the process of minimizing the cost with respect to
all the residential appliances in the system. The game analysis
for strategy is explained in the following model:
Game ¼ ½No of users n; ðSni Þ; ðuiðs1; s2 . . . snÞÞ ð4Þ
min
8n2N
XN
n¼1
XH
h
Cnt fðhÞ ð5Þwhich is the mathematical model of GTFT in the process of
developing a cost efficient model with holding different con-
straints. To characterize the selection process, the residential
users inhibit the behavior of choosing a utility company j to
obtain power for every slot. The users follow their strategy
to behave independently. As the number of consumers under
each utility provider is considered as N, the analytical deriva-
tions of obtaining Nash equilibrium of the game are derived
using the GTFT general strategy for the target of minimizing
the cost. From the strategy S there exists a winning strategy
Ws which converges at the Nash equilibrium stage to maximize
the individual payoff function. The strategy in GTFT game
follows that at each round, the consumer(player) actions
depend on the winning load profile with a probability pi. There
can be considered different reactive strategies at every round ti
which does not have any effects on the incentives obtained in
other round tiþ1.
The strategy Si is followed by each player n 2 N in the game
as such for every tiþ1 P 1 and hðti  1Þ 2 H with the following
observation of behavior of game:
Siðhðti  1ÞÞðciÞ ¼ 1 if piðti  1Þ ¼ 1 or ti ¼ 1
Siðhðti  1ÞÞðciÞ ¼ Si if pi ¼ 0

ð6Þ
The strategy actions of each user depend on the probability
state of cooperating, defending and not obtaining the incentive
(without rewards) as bi; ci; di. After each round of the proposed
game every user evaluates the probability depending upon the
strategy to cooperate. If the scheduling strategy attempted by
the consumer does not tend to minimize the cost, the player
moves to next round without retaliating.
S ¼ s1
s2
s3
bi ci di
b0 c0 d0
b1 c1 d1
b2 c2 d2
0
BBB@
1
CCCA ð7Þ
S3 ¼
Y3
i¼0
ððbi; ci; diÞjðbi þ ci þ di ¼ 1ÞÞ
fset of 3  3 probability among users; si 2 Sig ð8Þ3.1.1. Constraints
With respect to each individual PAR as Ri ind
Ri ind ¼
H maxðlhÞ
XH
h¼1
XN
n¼1
lhn
 !,
No of user N
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA ð9Þ
Ri indP Ei½h ! Ws½h ¼ 0
Ri ind 6 Ei½h ! Ws½h ¼ 1
 
; bi; ci; di P 0
where Ei indicates the per unit value of individual load profile
of the consumer. Based on the winning strategy matrix shifta-
ble appliances are scheduled in the particular users home.
Load scheduling followed by each user depends on the strategy
game applied for shifting the appliances which exhibits the
total DR of the game. Depending on scheduling for shiftable
and nonshiftable appliances constraints are derived. If shifta-
ble appliances such as washing machine which follows cycle
pattern and cannot be interrupted, it is denoted as gn ¼ 1
840 S. Sofana Reka, V. Rameshand nonshiftable as gn ¼ 2. To model the performance using
this game set a maximum delay is obtained as in Eq. (11):
Demand Response ½h ¼ Shiftable appliances ½h
þNonshiftable appliances ½h
Dgnmax ¼ gn  gfixed ð10Þ
fðhÞ ¼ Dgnmax
Pn
j¼1Sj
k
W½h þ
Xtþ1
t¼0
SjðhÞ
" #
ð11Þ
As k indicates the total number of hours a particular user is
winning the strategy.
3.1.2. Existence of Nash equilibrium
In the continuous process with repeated game slots, Nash equi-
librium convergence is obtained from all the players (users).
For instance let the strategy obtained from three users consid-
ered uðs1; s2; s3Þ and the total strategy obtained as S of the
entire game (repeated process) till an convergence of inequality
is obtained as shown in Eq. (3). The final model of the game is
given for payoff function in Eq. (12):
uiðsÞ ¼ pi 
1 ci
bi  ci
 
þmin
8n2N
XN
n¼1
XH
h
Cnt fðhÞ ð12Þ
in which the payoff function ui : si ! R represents payoff func-
tion of winning strategy of the user by gaining the maximum
profit for them. si is the strategy actions adapted by the users
at every round in the game, and s!i is the strategy adapted by
all other users except the current user. The entire model exhi-
bits the new game concept to obtain the best strategy and
thereby the winning strategy is updated by the convergence
of Nash equilibrium.
The implementation of algorithm in two step analysis is
explained clearly by considering three users as an example pre-
sented as follows:
 Maximum demand of the users considered for the initial
algorithm is set as for three users. Ca indicates the maxi-
mum demand of three users.
 Peak Average Ratio for the particular user and particular
hour.
 Total demand L for the particular hour (adding 3 customer
values for that particular hour). Finding here a Total
demand (three users, 4 h).
 Maximum demand value Lmax and arranging the load in
ascending order and also arranging the demand hours in
ascending order.
 Finding PAR for load profile L which is the load profile
obtained by adding load of three customers.
 Finding tariff for different customers and PAR for individ-
ual consumers can be obtained.
As an example based on the new PAR obtained, it is com-
pared with the load for that particular hour and cost is given
based on that value. Based on comparison, one of the values
from cost matrix is chosen, first case if demand is 0.06 less than
PAR value then cost is 0.15% for the particular hour and Cn is
the cost matrix for three customers considered for com-
putational simulation.Algorithm for Appliance Scheduling is explained as
follows:
i. Appliance array for each house, h ¼ 8, total no. of hrs
load can be shiftable. Pd ¼ 200, Pd is a power demand
considered in pu value.
ii. Based on the appliances, first we need to calculate total
no of appliances whose load can be shifted, then total
load which can be shifted, no of houses it can be
separated.
iii. In the considered case, load of 200 unit per hour is done,
as 8 h shift of load.
iv. The array obtained gives the random shifting of load for
8 h as in a random array generated with ones and zeroes,
once indicates the shifted hour, so for each customer 8 h
are chosen randomly.
v. Updating the appliance array based on minimum hours
array depending on the strategy obtained from the game
slot and the new appliance array is obtained by adding
shiftable hrs to minimum array found earlier so that
shiftable appliances can be used at minimum demand
hrs.
vi. To obtain total tariff for each consumer and finding
winning strategy for individual consumer.
vii. Arranging the demand hours in ascending order for
individual customers and updating the appliance array
based on minimum hrs for individual customers. On
the final step obtaining individual tariff for individual
customers.
4. Results and inference
The versatility of the proposed novel approach of Demand
side response modeling for domestic consumers has been
explained with mathematical calculations for a study of 3 users
and scheduling 15 appliances per hour basis. The time is calcu-
lated based on the tariff on IEX standard [28] which can be
extended to multiple consumers under utility providers. Case
analysis is made for a typical working day in an apartment,
also tariff ranges have been estimated and energy consumed
is analyzed.
The load profile for different users in a locality is simulated
which is given in Table 1.
The load profile calculated is shown in Fig. 5 for three users
and their power demand. Assume the number of users under a
utility is N. For every user neN, the calculations for PAR
required for the preliminary step in the proposed algorithm
are stated from [13].
Total load of the day is given as
Lh ¼
X
n2N
lhn ð13Þ
The daily peak and average load are calculated as
Lpeak ¼ max
h2H
Lh ð14Þ
Lavg ¼ 1
H
X
h2H
Lh ð15Þ
The Peak to Average Ratio (PAR) can be given as
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Figure 5 Load profile graph of users.
A demand response modeling for residential consumers 841PAR ¼ Lpeak
Lavg
¼
Hmax
h2H
LhP
h2HLh
ð16Þ
For example, three random users with four hours of ran-
dom calculated load profile are generated using MATLAB
with Gambit software. Then day-ahead schedule is created
by the utility. The following graph shows different load profile
for different home users. The generated values are
Lpeak ¼ 1:7401 kW
Lavg ¼ 1:4910 kW
PAR ¼ 0:3890
Table 2 shows the calculated tariff by the utility for three
users. The data presented in Table 3 consider as array in the
proposed novel algorithm for reduction in cost and shifting
the loads based on the PAR value. The case of a two bedroom
house used for scheduling of shiftable and non shiftable appli-
ances for a day is calculated by user preference in considera-
tion with a normal working day in a middle class family.
Fig. 6 shows the typical Tariff in a region according to IEX
[28] considered.
The above value and graph are the tariff generated by the
utility according to the load profile of the individual users
(three users). The second step involves the strategy taken by
the user in a dominant way. According to dominance equilib-
rium of the game theory, the dominant strategy is generated as
per the equation. At first the user’s strategy is stored as the
scheduling vector and the pay-off of the respective schedule
is calculated. Then the winning strategy is found and it is com-
pared against other strategies repeatedly. The winning strategy
is found from normal schedule using the game theory algo-
rithm. Tables 4 and 5 represent DR scheme before the game
theory’s dominant strategy and latter represents after the algo-
rithm is done. The graph inferred also exhibits the cost is min-
imal for different users. Currently in Table 4 the strategy is not
used and the cost is imbalanced among hours whereas as theTable 2 Tariff by the utility in (Rs.) of three users.
Domestic users Hour 1 Hour 2 Hour 3 Hour 4
User 1 100 100 43 43
User 2 100 100 43 62
User 3 43 43 43 100algorithm implemented, issues of DR congestion are consid-
ered on which the cost is reduced with linear power usage
and balance without disturbing the comfort of the users.
It can be seen that the winning strategy gives a distributed
load profile minimizing demand and cost will also be reduced
for highly paid users. Further, the performance of GTFT strat-
egy is evaluated in terms of energy consumption reduction in
par comparison with the energy consumption algorithm [29]
and the performance is evaluated with the optimized DSM
technique which is a conventional method of Game Theory
Energy Scheduler (GTES). The number of consumers can be
varied from 3 to 200 users. Each customer has to be connected
to the utility market through a smart meter and 15 appliances
are taken into consideration for scheduling. The developed
algorithm is simulated in MATLAB 13b by using 2.4 GHz
INTEL i3 processor personal computer with 2.0 GB RAM
and later to compare the running time it is checked from 3
to 50 users. Performance of the proposed method is compared
to other two existing methods. The results explicate the run-
ning time of the first method as a rapid increase while in con-
duction of the other game theory methods with a large set of
users. In Fig. 7 the iterations needed for the considered method
and the proposed method have been evaluated and plotted.
Here the performance and evaluation are carried out com-
pared with GTFT in a smart grid environment.
Fig. 7 clearly demonstrates the change in number of itera-
tions in Energy consumption game with the other two algo-
rithms and is a steep increase with number of users and also
there is a total increase in average time with the consumers
in comparison with the present algorithm. And further it
improvises the solution by optimization for each user. The
extended evaluation preambles this method is more scalable
for large set of users. Thereby on computational analysis made
by the proposed method with the other conventional ones, the
running time is comparatively decreased. It also exhibits as the
consumers increase, and there is a vitality of the method and
can hence validate faster. Fig. 8 clearly indicates the system
running time for the ten users.
Fig. 9 exhibits the system convergence of PAR and price of
the utility market for GTFT method with a scenario of 150
users. In this system PAR changes from 1.6 to 0.6 for the list
of users. In addition to that, the energy consumption is also
varied and considerably reduced. It further depicts that PAR
getting converged fast at every round of the algorithm. Only
after certain rounds it sets to some convergence point at 0.6
and gets stabilized. So it reaches the final Nash equilibrium
in game theory stage at this point for every consumer and also
it is done as these users find their own optimal schedule. As in
both the users and utility market can be benefited from the
proposed algorithm.
The new installation of power plants is reduced by energy
savings as the distribution and transmission capacity is consid-
erably reduced in power companies. The price function curve
exhibits a more marginable reduction of their energy bill of
the customers, on their own way of deduction of the load
schedule. Hitherto, if the number of consumers is increasing,
their ratio between the iterations and users can be decreased
a little. This can be ended more profoundly that the proposed
method approaches on high convergence speeds and they per-
form well with large number of consumers. The two main
issues in demand response modeling are achieving reduction
of cost for the users and minimizing PAR which increases in
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Figure 6 Typical tariff in a region according to IEX [8]
considered.
Table 4 Without game theory dominant strategy.
Without game theory Hour 1 Hour 2 Hour 3 Hour 4 Total cost
(Rs)
User 1 0 100 0 43 143
User 2 0 100 0 75 175
User 3 0 43 0 43 86
Table 5 With game theory winning strategy win stay and lose
shift.
With game theory Hour 1 Hour 2 Hour 3 Hour 4 Total cost (Rs)
User 1 0 0 43 43 86
User 2 0 100 62 75 237
User 3 0 43 0 43 86
Figure 7 Number of iterations for various users.
842 S. Sofana Reka, V. RameshPAR moves on to imbalance in a load shape in the energy con-
sumption on per day basis and also developing energy aware
consumption patterns in a successful manner.
The performance of GTFT method is evaluated by a two
step top down centralized game. The observation verifies that
the price parameter involved in the approach converges
Figure 8 System running time by considering users.
Figure 9 Convergence of PAR.
Figure 10 Convergence of the price.
Figure 11 Load curves for user 1 implementing with and without
DR algorithm.
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Figure 12 Analysis of users profile with DR strategy.
Figure 13 Analysis of users profile without DR strategy.
A demand response modeling for residential consumers 843appropriately faster both on the user and on the supplier side
as shown in Fig. 10. They converge at equilibrium and the
condition of demand response congestion is also validated
here. This approach implies more convergence speed. Thereby
the good approach can be understood not only by shifting the
energy consumption but also adjusting the consumption of
energy accurately at regular intervals of time during different
hours without DR congestion to make a successful scheme.
Fig. 11 represents the load curve of one user implemented by
the proposed algorithm as such the proposed one is a compar-
ative analysis with the other algorithm. It clearly explains that
the consumers considered for analysis from 3 to 200 users. It
shows without the proposed model from the change in time
along the day. It exhibits from the load curve analysis that
for user 1 in the first iteration, the demand power from themorning hours around 10 am is used more and there is a bal-
ance in demand of power compared without the use of strategy.
Figs. 12 and 13 represent the set of users implemented with the
DR strategy and without DR model with respect to load
scheduling developed on daily basis. It portrays from the results
of computational simulation and user 1 to user 3 the DR con-
gestion issue is managed as when the load scheduling is shifted
Figure 14 Cost curve.
844 S. Sofana Reka, V. Rameshfrom non-peak hours to peak hours, there is some congestion
among them. As such in the proposed one, it is being
managed and distributed along the entire full day basis. And
as implementing this way the non-peak hours tariff is balanced
without any increase in bill so the cost of users is balanced the
entire day and this strategy has expected a proven success.
Fig. 14 shows the results compared with the method, and the
cost of the one user is reduced considerably in the peak hours.
Compared to the other methods, the curve is more of a linear
one, where the method is a nonlinear curve. Cost curve indi-
cates that the consumer need not to pay extensively for using
power during peak hour times as it is balanced and the cost is
considerably decreased in this method.5. Conclusion
In this proposed work, a new methodology has been adapted
creating a working model between the user and the utility for
reduction of the tariff using the analysis of PAR in every cus-
tomer interaction and also considering the change in peak
load hours by scheduling the appliances using game theory
strategy among the users. Thereby the new demand response
algorithm works for multi users in a locality, demonstrating
its dynamic behavior. The results have been analyzed using
a particular set of consumers as case study and the work is
more established by evaluating the results with conventional
methods. This strategy portrays the reduction of cost, mini-
mizes PAR and proves its dynamic nature by considering
DR congestion case. The work can be extended in a different
approach by introducing the same algorithm in different soft
computing techniques with the addition of renewable energy
sources. Thereby a complete DSM toolbox for home area
management can be developed using the present day tech-
niques such as Big data computation and Cloud Computing
techniques.
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